The Ordinatio of John Duns Scotus :: Ordinatio. Book 1. Distinction 3. ::

Question Four. Whether any Certain and Sincere Truth could Naturally be Known by the Intellect of the Wayfarer without a Special Illumining of Uncreated Light

202. Finally, as concerns this matter of knowability, I ask whether any certain and sincere truth can naturally be known by the intellect of the wayfarer without a special illumining of uncreated light.

I argue that it cannot:

Augustine On the Trinity 9 ch.6 n.9, “Let us gaze on the inviolable truth from which we may define what sort of mind of man is due to eternal reasons.” And ibid. n.10, “When we approve or disapprove something rightly or not rightly, we are convicted into approving or disapproving by other rules abiding above us.” And ibid. n.11, “We grasp by simple intelligence an art ineffably beautiful above the acuity of the mind.” And in the same place, ch.7 n.12, “In that truth do we perceive the form by which all temporal things are made, and from it do we obtain true knowledge conceived as a word in us” [cf. Henry of Ghent, Summa a.1 q.2].

203. Again On the Trinity 12 ch.2 n.3, “It belongs to a sublimer reason to judge of these bodies according to eternal reasons.”

204. Again, ibid. ch.14 n.23, “Not only of sensible things located in their places are there abiding unchangeable reasons etc.” And that he means there eternal reasons truly in God is proved by this, that in the same place he says, “it belongs to few to reach them;” but if he meant first principles, to reach those does not belong to few but to many, because they are known and common to all.

205. Again ibid. 14 ch.15 n.21, when speaking of the unjust man who “rightly praises and blames many things in human morals,” he says, “By what rules does he judge etc .?” And at the end he says, “Where are those rules written, save in the book of light?” That book of light is the divine intellect. Therefore he maintains that in that light the unjust sees what is to be justly done, and that the light is seen in some impressed book or something impressed by the book, as he says ibid., “hence every just law is transmitted to the heart of man not by departing its origin but as it were by impression, as the image from a ring both passes into the wax and does not leave the wax.”³⁷ Therefore we see in the light by which justice is impressed on the heart of man. But that light is the uncreated light.

206. Again Augustine Confessions 12 ch.15 n.35, “If we both see the true, neither do you see it in me nor I in you, but both of us in that which is above the mind, the unchangeable truth.” And there are many other authorities from Augustine, in many places, for proving this conclusion [several collected by Henry of Ghent, Summa a.1 q.2].

207. To the opposite:

Romans 1.20, “The invisible things of God from the creation of the world are seen through the things that have been made, once they are understood.” These eternal reasons [nn.202-204] are the invisible things of God; therefore, they are known from creatures; so before they are seen, a knowledge of creatures is possessed that is certain.

I. Opinion of Henry

208. In this question there is an opinion of the following sort [Henry of Ghent, Summa a.1 q.2], that general intentions [concepts] have a natural ordering among themselves. Let us speak about the two intentions that relate to the issue at hand, namely the intention of being and of true.

The first intention is that of being, as is proved by what is said in the fourth proposition of On Causes, “The first of created things is ‘to be’,” and in the commentary on the first proposition, “‘To be’ is of greater inherence [sc. than truth];” and the reason is that being is absolute, truth states relation to an exemplar. From this follows that being can be known under the idea of being, even though not under the idea of truth.a

This conclusion is proved also on the part of the intellect: because being can be conceived in a simple intellection and then is that which is true conceived; but the idea of truth can only be conceived by an intellection that combines and divides [sc. terms in a proposition]; simple intellection precedes composition and division.

a.a [Interpolated text] and consequently that which is true can be known before truth itself is known [cf. Scotus, Lectura I d.3 n.153]

209. And if a question be asked about the knowledge of being, or of that which is true, it is said [sc. by Henry] that the intellect can, of its pure natural powers, thus understand the true, of which the proof is that it is unacceptable for “nature to be without is proper operation,” according to Damascene Orthodox Faith III ch.15 n.234. And this is more unacceptable in a more perfect nature, according to the Philosopher, On the Heavens 2.8.290a29-35, about the stars [Henry, Summa a.24 q.1, Scotus Ord. Prol. n.76].a Therefore, since the proper operation of the intellect is to understand the true, it seems unacceptable that nature would not have granted the intellect the things that are sufficient for this operation.

a.a [Interpolated text] because it would be very unacceptable for the stars to have power for progression and not have instruments for progression.

210. But if we speak about knowledge of truth, the response is made that, just as there is a double exemplar, created and uncreated (according to Plato in the Timaeus 2829, namely the made and non-made, created and non-created, exemplar; the created exemplar is the universal species created by the thing, the uncreated exemplar is the idea in the divine mind), so there is a double conformity to an exemplar and a double truth.

One is conformity to the created exemplar, and in this way did Aristotle [Metaphysics 1.1.981a5-7, Posterior Analytics 2.18.100a3-8; also Henry, ibid., a.1 q.1 ad 4] posit that the truths of things are known through their conformity to the intelligible species. And so does Augustine seems to posit in On the Trinity 8.4 n.7, where he maintains that we get the knowledge, general and special, of things collected from sensibles, according to which knowledge we judge about each thing that confronts us that it is this sort or that sort.

211. But that through such acquired exemplar in us an altogether certain and infallible knowledge of truth is obtained about a thing - this seems altogether impossible. And it is proved by a threefold reason, according to them [Henry, ibid., a.1 q.2]. The first is taken form the side of the thing of which an exemplar is abstracted; the second from the side of the subject in which it is; the third from the side of the exemplar in itself.

The first reason is of this sort: the object from which the exemplar is abstracted is changeable; therefore, it cannot be the cause of anything unchangeable; but the certain knowledge that anyone has about anything under the idea of truth is held in him through an unchangeable reason; therefore it is not held through such an exemplar. This reason is said to be Augustine’s in 83 Questions q.9, where he says that “truth is not to be expected from sensibles,” because “sensibles ceaselessly change.”

212. The second reason is of this sort: the soul is of itself changeable and subject to error; therefore by nothing changeable can it be set right or ruled over so as not to err; but such an exemplar in the soul is more changeable than is the soul itself; therefore the exemplar does not perfectly rule over the soul so that it not err.a This reason is said to be Augustine’s in On True Religion ch.30 n.56, “The law of all arts etc .”

a.a [Interpolated text] so a special higher influence is required [cf. Scotus Lectura I d.3 n.158; infra n.216]

213. The third reason: no one has a certain and infallible knowledge of truth unless he have whereby he could discriminate the true from the likely true; because if he cannot discriminate the true from the false or from the likely true he can be in doubt whether he is being deceived; but through the aforesaid created exemplar he cannot discriminate the true from the likely true; therefore etc . Proof of the minor: such a species can represent itself as itself or, in another way, as the object, as is the case in dreams. If it represent itself as the object, there is falsity; if it represent itself as itself, there is truth. Therefore, through such species, nothing is obtained that sufficiently distinguishes between when it represents itself as itself or when as the object, and so nothing is obtained either that sufficiently distinguishes the true from the false.

214. From these the conclusion is drawn that, if it do happen that man have knowledge of certain science and infallible truth, this does not happen to him by looking at an exemplar taken from the thing through the senses, however much this is purified and made universal; but what is required is that he look back at the uncreated exemplar. And then the mode of positing it is as follows: not as something known does God have the idea of exemplar by which, when being looked at, genuine truth is known, for he is known in a general attribute; but God is the reason for knowing as he is bare exemplar and proper reason of created essence.

215. As to how he can be the reason for knowing and not be something known, an example is posited, that it is just as a ray of the sun sometimes arrives in an oblique line, as it were, from its source and sometimes in a direct line; because although the reason for seeing what is seen in a ray that arrives in the first way is the sun, yet not as seen in itself; but for knowing what is seen in the ray in the second way the sun is the reason because it is also known. When therefore this uncreated light illumines the intellect in, as it were, a direct line, then it is, as seen, the idea of seeing other things in itself. But the uncreated light illumines our intellect for this state of life in, as it were, an oblique line, and therefore is it for our intellect an unseen reason for seeing.

216. And a way is posited how [the uncreated light] may possess a threefold idea in respect of the act of seeing, the idea namely of the light that stimulates, of the species that affects, of the character or exemplar that configures. And from this the conclusion is further drawn that a special influence is required, because just as that essence is not seen naturally by us in itself, so is that essence as it is exemplar with respect to a creature not naturally seen (according to Augustine On Seeing God [Epistle 147 to Paulina ch.6 n.18]), for that it is seen is in God’s power: “if he wants, it is seen; if he does not, it is not seen.”

217. Finally it is added that perfect knowledge of the truth is when two exemplar species come together in the mind: one inherent in it, namely the created one, the other flowing into it, namely the uncreated one; and thus do we attain the word of perfect truth.a

a.a [Interpolated text, in place of ‘and thus do we attain...’] shining in the mind. And after a single idea has from these two species been put together for understanding the thing whose idea it is, the mind conceives it [Henry, Summa a.1 q.3].

II. Attack on Henry’s Opinion and Solution of the Question

218. Against this opinion I show first [nn.219-228] that these reasons [nn.211-213] are not fundamental reasons for any true opinion, and that they are not in accord with Augustine’s intention, but favor the opinion of the Academic [sceptics]; second [nn.229-245] I show how the opinion of the Academics [n.227], which seems proved by these reasons, is false, and third [nn.246-257] I reply to the reasons insofar as they are not as probative; fourth [nn.258-260] I argue against the conclusion of this opinion [nn.214-217]; fifth [nn.261-279] I solve the question [n.202]; sixth [n.280] I show how the reasons, insofar as they are Augustine’s, prove the intention of Augustine, not the one for which they are here adduced.a

a.a [Note by Scotus] I argue against this opinion [nn.214-217] in itself, second against the fundamental reasons [n.211-213] that are adduced, or conversely [sc. against the reasons first and then the opinion]. The first includes the fourth article [n. 218] (which is a question directed at the man), and the second [n.218] (which is directed at the thing); the second article includes the first (here) and the third and sixth; the fifth [n.218] article, therefore, is the solution of the question.

A. Against the Fundamental Reasons Adduced

219. First. These reasons [nn.211-213] seem to prove the impossibility of natural certain knowledge.

The first because if the object is ceaselessly changing, neither is it possible for any certitude to be had of it under the idea of the changeless, indeed nor could certitude be had of it in any light whatever, because there is no certitude when the object is known in a way other than it is. Therefore, neither is there certitude in knowing the changeable as unchangeable. It is plain too that the antecedent of this reason, namely that sensibles are ceaselessly moving, is false; for this is the option that is imputed to Heraclitus in Metaphysics 4.5.1010a7-11.

220. Likewise if, because of the changeableness of the exemplar, what is in our soul could not be certitude [n.212], then since whatever is put subjectively in the soul is changeable, the very act of understanding as well, it follows that by nothing in the soul is the soul put right so as not to err.a

a.a [Interpolated text] It follows too that the very act of understanding, since it is more changeable than the soul itself in which it is, will never be true, nor contain truth [cf. Scotus, Lectura I d.3 n169].

221. Similarly, according to this opinion, the inhering created species combines with the inflowing species [n.217]. But when something is combined that is repugnant to certitude, certitude cannot be obtained. For just as from a necessary proposition and a contingent proposition only a contingent proposition follows, so from something certain and something uncertain combining together for some knowledge no certain knowledge follows.

222. The same is plain also about the third reason [n.213], because if the very species abstracted from the thing combines with all knowing, and if no judgement can be made as to when the species represents itself as itself and when it represents itself as the object, then, whatever else combines with it, no certitude can be obtained by which the true may be discriminated from the likely true. These reasons, therefore, seem to conclude to the complete lack of certitude and opinion of the Academic [sceptics].

223. And I give proof that this conclusion [n.222] is not Augustine’s intention:

Augustine Soliloquies 1.8 n.15, “Everyone admits without any doubt the proofs of the learned sciences to be most true.” And Boethius On the Hebdomads, “A common conception of the mind is what each approves when he hears it.” And the Philosopher in Metaphysics 2.1.993b4-5, “First principles are known to everyone like a door to a house, because as a door to a house is open to view, though the interior of the house is not, so are the first principles known to everyone.”

224. From these three authorities [n.223] the argument goes as follows. What belongs to everything of some species follows the specific nature. Therefore, when each has infallible certitude of the first principles, and further when the form of a perfect syllogism is naturally evident to each (from the definition of a perfect syllogism in Prior Analytics 1.1.24b22-24), and the science of the conclusions depends only on the evidence of the principle and the evidence of the syllogistic inference for each - any conclusion, therefore, demonstrable from the self-evident principles, can be naturally known to everyone.

225. Second, it is clear that Augustine allows certainty of things known by sense experience; hence he says On the Trinity 15.12 n.21, “Far be it that we should doubt the things to be true that we have learnt through the senses of the body, for indeed through them we have learnt heaven and earth and sea and all that is in them.” If we do not doubt of the truth of them, and we are not deceived, as is plain, then we are certain of the things we know through the senses; for certitude is had when doubt and deception are excluded.

226. It is also plain, third, that Augustine allows certitude of our acts, ibid., “Whether one sleeps or awake, one lives, because both to sleep and to see in dreams belong to one who is alive.”

227. But if you say that ‘to live’ is not second act but first act, there follows ibid., “If someone say I know that I know I am alive, he cannot be deceived,” even when reflecting back however often on the first ‘I know’. And ibid., “If someone say ‘I want to be blessed’, how is it not impudent to reply, ‘perhaps you are deceived?’,” and by reflecting there the ‘I know I want’ “endlessly etc.” Ibid., “If anyone say, ‘I do not wish to err’, will it not surely be true that he does not want to err?” “And other things,” he says, “are found that are valid against the academics, who contend that nothing can be known by man.” There follows ibid., about the three books Against the Academics, “he who has understood those books will be moved not at all by their many arguments against the perception of truth.”

228. Again, ibid. ch.15 n.25, “Things that are so known they could never be lost also belong to the nature of the soul itself, of which sort is that we know we live.”a So the first point is plain [n.218].b

a.a [Note by Scotus] One must note that there are four cognitive awarenesses [cf. nn.224-227, 240245], wherein for us is necessary certitude, namely: of things knowable simply [nn.230-234], things knowable through experience [nn.235-237], our own acts [nn.238-239], and things known by us, through the senses, as they now are [nn.240-245]. The first is manifest [n.230]; the third is concluded to be known per se, otherwise there would be no judgment as to what was known per se [cf. n.238]; the second and fourth contain infinite propositions known per se [nn.235, 241], to which they join others from the several senses. Example: a triangle has three [angles equal to two right angles, cf. Ord. I d.2 n.27], the moon is being eclipsed, I am awake, that is white - the first and the third need the senses only as occasion, because, were all the senses to err, there exists certitude simply [cf. nn.234, 238-239]. The second and fourth hold through this principle, namely that what eventuates frequently from something not free has that something as its per se natural cause [cf. nn.235, 240]; from this does the proposed conclusion follow. In the second and the fourth a necessary proposition is sometimes added [as in nn.236, 242, 244]. So you may put off Augustine’s authorities [nn.225-228] to the second article [cf. n.229], which deals with the matter, or which is the solution [sc. about the above four infallible certitudes].

b.b [Interpolated text] as to how his [Henry’s] reasons are not probative, and [the conclusion] false and against Augustine.

B. Against the Opinion in Itself

229. As to the second article [n.218], in order for the error of the academics to have no place in any knowables, one needs to see how one should speak about the three aforesaid knowables [nn.224-228] - namely about principles known per se and conclusions, and second about things known through experience, and third about our own acts - whether it be possible for infallible certitude of them to be possessed.

230. [About the knowledge of principles and conclusions] - As to certitude about principles, then, I say as follows: the terms of principles known per se have such an identity that the one includes the other with evident necessity, and so the intellect, combining the terms from the fact it apprehends them, has in itself the necessary cause of the conformity of the act of combining with the terms themselves of which it is the combining, and has also the evident cause of such conformity; and so to it is necessarily plain the conformity whose evident cause it apprehends in the terms. Therefore, the intellect cannot have an apprehension of the terms, and a combining of them, without there being a conformity of that combining with the terms, just as a white thing and a white thing cannot be without a likeness being between them. Now this conformity of the combining with the terms is the truth of the combining; therefore, the combining of such terms cannot be without being true, and so the perception of the combining and the perception of the terms cannot be without perception of the conformity of the combining with the terms, and so without perception of the truth, because the first perceived things evidently include the perception of this truth.

231. This reason is confirmed through a likeness, from the Philosopher Metaphysics 4.3.1005b29-32, where he maintains that the opposite of a first principle cannot arrive in anyone’s intellect, namely the opposite of this principle ‘it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be’, “because then contrary opinions would exist in the mind together;” because it is, of course, true of contrary opinions, that is, of opinions formally repugnant, that an opinion opinining ‘it is’ of something and an opinion opining ‘it is not’ of the same thing are formally repugnant.

232. So I assert, in the issue at hand, some repugnance of understandings in the mind, though not formal repugnance. For if knowledge of whole and part stands in the intellect, and the combining together of them, then, since these include, as by necessary cause, the conformity of the combining with the terms, if the opinion stand in the intellect that this combining is false, cognitions will stand that are repugnant, not formally, but one cognition will stand with another and yet it will be the necessary cause of a cognition opposite to it, which is impossible. For just as it is impossible for white and black to stand together (because they are contraries formally), so is it impossible for white to stand together with what is precisely cause of black, thus necessarily cause, because unable, without contradiction, to be without it [sc. black].

233. When certitude about first principles is possessed [nn.230-232], it is plain how it will be possessed about conclusions inferred from them, on account of the evidence of the form of a perfect syllogism; for the certitude of the conclusion depends only on the certitude of the principles and on the evidence of the inference.

234. But will the intellect really not err in this knowledge of principles and conclusions, if all the senses are deceived about the terms?

I reply that, as far as concerns this knowledge, the intellect does not have the senses as cause but only as occasion. For the intellect can have of simples only knowledge received from the senses, but, once the knowledge is received, it can by its own virtue combine the simples together. And if by reason of such simples the combination of them is evidently true, the intellect will by its own virtue and by virtue of the terms assent to the combination - not by virtue of the senses from which it exteriorly gets the terms. An example: if the idea of ‘whole’ and the idea of ‘being greater’ is received from the senses, and if the intellect put together this proposition, ‘every whole is greater than its part’, the intellect will by its own virtue and by that of these terms assent indubitably to this combination, and will not just do so because it saw the terms conjoined in reality (the way it assents to this complex, ‘Socrates is white’, because it sees that these are united in reality). Indeed, I say that if all the senses from which such terms are received were false, or if (and this counts more for deception) some senses were false and some were true, the intellect would not be deceived about such principles, because it would always have in itself the terms that were cause of the truth; as suppose that on someone born blind were miraculously impressed in a dream the species of white and black, and suppose these species remained afterwards when he was awake, his intellect by abstracting would combine from them this proposition, ‘white is not black’, and about it his intellect would not be deceived although the terms were received from erring sense; for the formal idea of the terms, which has been reached, is the necessary cause of the truth of this negative proposition.

235. [About knowledge through experience] - About the second knowables, namely things known through experience [n.229], I say that although experience not be of all singulars but of many, nor always but often, yet someone with experience does infallibly know that so it is both always and in all things, and this through this proposition residing in the soul, ‘whatever comes about for the most part from a non-free cause is the natural effect of that cause’. This proposition is known to the intellect even had it taken its terms from erring sense, because a non-free cause cannot produce non-freely an effect for the most part, the opposite of which it is ordered to, or which it is not ordered to by its form. But a chance cause is ordered to producing the opposite of a chance effect or to not producing it; therefore nothing is a chance cause of an effect that is frequently produced by it, and so, if it is not free, it will be the natural cause.a And this effect comes about from the cause for the most part; this is taken from experience. For, after finding such a nature now with this sort of accident now with that, what is found is that, however great the diversity of accidents, always was such effect consequent to this nature. Therefore, the effect did not follow some accident of this nature, but from the nature itself in itself did such effect follow.

a.a [Interpolated text - in place of “therefore nothing.. .natural cause”] therefore it is a natural cause of an effect frequently produced by it, because it is not a chance cause.

236. But further to be noted is that sometimes experience is had of a conclusion, as that the moon is frequently eclipsed, and then, on the supposition of the conclusion that so things are, a cause of this conclusion is looked for by way of division. And sometimes from experiencing the conclusion one reaches principles known from the terms. And then, from such a principle known from the terms can the conclusion, known previously only by experience, be known more certainly, namely with the first kind of knowledge, because known as deduced from a principle known per se [nn.229-230] - the way this is per se known, that ‘a dark body interposed between a manifest body and the light is preventing the multiplication of the light to such manifest body’. And if it has been found by division that the earth is such a body interposed between the sun and the moon, this will be known most certainly by a demonstration ‘because of which’ (because through the cause), and not only by experience in the way this conclusion was known before the finding of the principle.

237. Now sometimes there is experience of a principle, so that it is not possible to find by way of division a further principle known from the terms, but a stand is made in something true for the most part, whose extreme terms are known by experience to be frequently united, for example that this plant of this sort of species is hot. And there is no prior middle term found whereby the property may be proved of the subject by a demonstration ‘because of which’, but a stand is made in this as in something that is on account of experiences a first known. Although then uncertainty and fallibility may be removed by this proposition, ‘an effect for the most part of a non-free cause is the natural effect of it’, yet this is the last degree of scientific knowledge. And perhaps in that case actual knowledge is not had of the union of the extreme terms, but aptitudinal knowledge. For if the property is some absolute thing other than the subject, it could be separated from the subject without contradiction, and the experienced person would not have knowledge that it is so, but that it is apt to be so.

238. [About our acts] - About the third knowables, namely our own acts [n.229], I say that there is certitude about many of them, as there is of things known first and per se, as is plain from Metaphysics 4.6.1011a3-9, where the Philosopher says of the arguments of those who say that all appearances are true, because those arguments ask “whether we are now awake or sleeping; and all such doubts have the same effect; for they make it an axiom that there is a reason for everything.” And he adds, “they are asking for a reason for things of which there is no reason, for there is no demonstration of a principle of demonstration.” So, for Aristotle there, ‘we are awake’ is known per se like a principle of demonstration; nor is it an objection that it is contingent because, as was said elsewhere [Ord. Prol. n.169], there is an order in contingent things, for some of them are first and immediate, else there would be a process to infinity in contingent things, or something contingent would follow from a necessary cause, both of which are impossible.

239. And just as there is certitude about being awake as about something known per se, so also about many other acts that are in our power (as that I understand or I am hearing), and about others that are perfect acts. For although there is no certitude that I am seeing a white thing located outside, or in such a subject or at such a distance, because an illusion can occur in the medium or in the organ and in many other ways, yet there is certitude that I am seeing, even if there is illusion in the organ. And this seems most of all to be an illusion, namely when, without an object being present, an act in the organ arises of the sort that is of a nature to arise in the presence of an object. And so if the power had its own action when such a condition is posited, that which would be called vision would truly be there, whether it be an action or a passion or both. But if an illusion were to happen, not in the organ proper, but in something close to it that the organ seems to be -as that if an illusion were not to occur in the bundle of the nerves, but that in the eye itself an impression were to arise of the sort of species that is of a nature to arise from a white thing - still the eye would be seeing, because such a species, or what is of a nature to be seen in it, would be seen. For it has distance enough as regard the organ of sight that is in the bundle of the nerves, as appears in Augustine On the Trinity 11.3 n.4, that the reliquies of things seen remaining in the eye are seen with the eyes closed; and in the Philosopher On Sense and Sensed Object 2.437a23-26, it appears that the fire [the ‘flash’] which is generated from a violent upward raising of the eye and reduplicated is seen until the eyelids are shut. These are true seeings, though not the most perfect ones, because there are here sufficient distances from the species to the principal organ of sight.

240. But how is certitude had of things that are subject to the acts of sense, as that something outside is the sort of white or hot that appears?

I reply:

Either the same things about such an object appear opposite to diverse senses, or they do not, but all the senses that know it have the same judgment about it.

241. If in the second way, then certitude of the truth is had of this sort of thing known through the senses and through this proposition from before [n.235], that ‘what is brought about for the most part by something, that something is the natural cause of it, provided it not be a free cause’. Therefore, when this something is present and from it this sort of change arises in the senses for the most part, it follows that the change, or the generated species, is the natural effect of such a cause; and so such thing outside will be white or hot, or some other such thing as is of a nature to be presented through the species that is for the most part generated by it.

242. But if diverse senses have diverse judgments about something seen outside, as that sight says a stick part of which is in water and part in the air is broken, that sight always says the sun is of less size than it is, and that everything seen from a distance is smaller than it is - in such things there is certitude about what is true, and about which sense is erring, through a proposition resting in the soul that is more certain than any judgment of the senses, and through the acts coming together of several senses; so that always some proposition sets the intellect right about the acts of the senses, about which is true and which is false; and in this proposition the intellect does not depend on the senses as on a cause, but as on an occasion.

243. An example. The intellect has this proposition resting in it, ‘no thing that is rather hard is broken by touching something soft that yields to it’. This is so per se known from the terms that, even if the terms were taken from the senses, the intellect cannot doubt of it; indeed, the opposite includes a contradiction. But that the stick is harder than water and that water yields to it, this each sense states, both sight and touch. It follows, therefore, that the stick is not broken as the senses judge it broken; and so which sense errs and which does not about the breaking of the stick, the intellect judges through something more certain than every act of the senses.

244. Similarly, on the other part [sc. the size of the sun, n.242], the fact that a quantity placed altogether against a quantity is equal to it, this is known to the intellect however much the knowledge of the terms be taken from an erring sense; but that the same quantity could be placed against something seen near at hand and far off, this both sight and touch say; therefore the quantity is equal whether seen near at hand or far off; therefore the sight when saying it is smaller is in error.

245. This conclusion [n.244] is proved from principles known per se, and from the acts of two senses that know that so things are for the most part. And so, whenever reason judges the senses to be erring, it judges this not through any knowledge precisely acquired from the senses as from the cause, but through some knowledge occasioned by the senses, in which it is not deceived even if all the senses are deceived [n.234], and by some other knowledge, acquired from a sense or senses, that is ‘for the most part’, and these are known to be true by the proposition often cited [nn.235, 237, 241, added note to n.228], namely that ‘what is brought about for the most part etc.’a

a.a [Interpolated note] - But note that if all the senses erred about all sensible objects common to all the senses [cf. Ord. Prol. n.33] (for example about figure, quantity, or about this figure or this quantity, or that one thing was two, or that this one thing, as a head, was two heads), then the intellect could not have any certitude about it from the senses, by the fact all the senses are erring -or because each sense is erring about its own proper object; and this happens in two ways, either about this color or that, or about a white or black thing. In the first way the sense is not in error about its first object, and so neither is the intellect; but if the sense is deceived about a secondary object, as sight [about a white or black thing],³⁸and then either all sight is deceived about such secondary object, and then there can be no certain knowledge in the intellect, or some sight is deceived and some not, and then [the intellect] can have certitude in another individual, though not in this one.

C. Against the Fundamental Reasons insofar as they are Less Probative

246. As to the third article [n.218], a response must be made from the preceding [nn.230-245] to the three reasons [of Henry, nn.211-213].a

To the first argument [n.211], as to the point about the change of the object, the antecedent is false;b nor is it the opinion of Augustine but the error of Heraclitus and of his disciple Cratylus, who did not want to speak but to move his finger, as is said in Metaphysics 4.5.1010a7-15. And the consequence, given the antecedent were true, is not valid, because, according to Aristotle, certain knowledge could still be had of this fact, that all things would be continually moving. Also, it does not follow that, if the object is changeable, then what is produced by it is not representative of anything under the idea of the unchangeable [n.211]; for the changeability in the object is not the reason for generating [knowledge], but the nature of the object itself that is changeable. The thing generated by it, therefore, represents the nature per se. If, therefore, the nature, whereby it is nature, have some unchangeable relationship to something else, that something else through its exemplar, and the nature itself through its exemplar, are represented as unchangeably united; and thus, through two exemplars, generated by two changeable things - not insofar as they changeable but insofar as they are natures - knowledge of the unchangeability of their union can be had.

a.a [Note by Scotus] Note that knowledge of a principle cannot be changed from truth to falsity [n.250], nor the other way around, because it is simply incorruptible. The intelligible species, not the phantasm, can in this way be destroyed, but it cannot be changed from a true representation to a false one [n.251]. But the object, although corruptible, yet cannot be changed from a true entity to a false one [n.246]; and so it conforms knowledge to itself or causes knowledge of itself by its truth in existing, because a true entity, unchangeable into a false one, virtually contains true knowledge, that is, knowledge in conformity with a true entity.
Note, according to Augustine that a necessary or unchangeable truth is “above the mind” [n.206], meaning ‘in idea of evident truth’, because it causes evident truth about itself in the mind [n.230]. But it is not, according to the evidence of it, subject to the mind so that it could appear true or false, in the way a probable truth is subject to the mind so that the mind, by seeking reasons here or there through which it may be proved or disproved [n.202], could make it appear true or false [n.250]. Thus must it be understood that the mind does not judge about the immutable truth [n.203], but of other things; because a declaration that ‘this is true’, which is an act of judging, is in the power of the mind with respect to what is probable, but not with respect to what is necessary; nor yet does it less perfectly assert of the necessary that it is ‘true’ - and this assertion in Aristotle can be said to be a judgment [sc. ‘the same thing cannot both be and not be’, n.231], but Augustine maintains [n.203] that judgment is in the power of the judger, not something that at once may be necessarily determined by something else.
In this way is it plain how the mind judges of a necessary conclusion [n.233]. Since the conclusion is not of itself at once evident, therefore does it not of itself give determination to the mind itself as to the evidence for itself; also the mind can bring forward sophistical arguments against it, by which the mind may dissent from it - not so against what is a first known, Metaphysics 4.3.1005a29-6a18 (“comes into the mind etc .” [n.255]).

b.b [Interpolated text] for sensibles are not in continuous motion, rather they remain the same for some time [cf. Scotus, Lectura I d.3 n.182].

247. Although it not generate insofar as it is changeable, yet, if it is changeable, how is its relation to something else unchangeable?

I reply: the relation is unchangeable in this way, that there cannot be an opposite relation between the extremes, neither can this relation not exist, given the extremes, but it is destroyed by the destruction of the extreme or the extremes.

248. On the contrary: how is a necessary proposition affirmed if the identity of the extremes can be destroyed?

I reply: when the thing does not exist, there is no real identity of it. But then, if it is in the intellect, there is identity as it is an understood object, and it is in a certain respect necessary, because in such existence the extremes cannot be without such identity. However, it is able not to be, just as the extreme is able to be non-understood. Therefore, a proposition is necessary in a certain respect in our intellect, because it cannot be changed to the false; but it is not simply necessary save in the divine intellect, just as neither do the extremes have an identity simply necessarily in any being save in understood being.

249. It is plain too that something representative that is changeable in itself can represent something under the idea of the unchangeable, because the essence of God will, under the idea of the unchangeable, be represented to the intellect through something altogether changeable, whether it be a species or an act; this is plain through a likeness, because through the finite can something under the idea of the infinite be represented.

250. To the second argument [of Henry, n.212] I say that in the soul a twofold changeability can be understood, one from affirmation to negation and conversely (as from ignorance to knowledge or from non-intellection to intellection), another from, as it were, contrary to contrary, as from rectitude to deception or conversely.

Now the soul is changeable as to all objects in the first way, and by nothing formally existing in it is such changeability taken away from it. But it is not changeable with the second changeableness save as to the complexes [propositions] that are not evident from the terms. But about those that are evident from the terms the soul cannot be changed with the second changeableness, because, once the terms themselves are understood, they are a necessary and evident cause of the conformity with the terms themselves of the composition that has been made [n.230]. Therefore, if the soul is changeable from rightness to error, absolutely, it does not follow that by nothing can it be set right other than itself; at least as regard the objects about which the intellect cannot err it can be set right by the terms once they have been apprehended.

251. To the third argument [of Henry, n.213] I say that if it had any appearance [of truth], it would conclude more against [Henry’s] opinion that denies intelligible species,a because a species that can represent something sensible as an object in dreams would be a phantasm, not an intelligible species. Therefore, if the intellect use only a phantasm by which the object is present to it and not any intelligible species, it does not seem it could discriminate the true from the likely true through anything in which the object shines out for it. But if one posits a species in the intellect, [Henry’s] reasoning is not valid, for the intellect cannot use the species [sc. as opposed to a phantasm] as object for itself, because it cannot use it when sleeping.

a.a [Note by Scotus] which is the opinion of him who posits this opinion here [nn.211-213].

252. If you object that, if the phantasm can represent itself as the object, then the intellect, through that error of the imaginative power, can err, or at any rate it can be so bound that it cannot operate, as is plain in dreams and the mad - it can be said [in reply] that, though the intellect be bound when there is such error in the imaginative power, yet it does not err, because it does not then have an act.

253. But how will the intellect know, or how then will it be certain, when the imaginative power is erring, but its not being in error is required for the intellect not to be in error?

I reply. This truth rests in the intellect, that a power does not err about an object proportioned to it unless it is indisposed. And it is known to the intellect that the power of imagination is not, when awake, indisposed with any such indisposition as makes a phantasm represent itself as an object; for it is per se known to the intellect that, when thinking, it is awake, such that the power of imagination is not, as it is in dreams, bound during wakefulness.

254. But an objection against the stated certitude about acts is still made in this way: ‘it seems to me that I am seeing or hearing, when however I am not seeing or hearing; so there is no certitude about this’.

255. I reply.

It is one thing to show against someone who denies a proposition that the proposition is true; it is another thing to show to someone who accepts it how it is true. An example from Metaphysics 4.3.1005a29-6a18: the Philosopher does not introduce, against someone who denies the first principle [sc. the principle of non-contradiction], the unacceptable result that contrary opinions would simultaneously exist in the soul [n.231] (the deniers would concede this themselves as presupposed); rather he brings in other unacceptable results, more manifest to them, though not in themselves. But to those who accept the first principle he shows how it is known, that it is such that its opposite could not come into the mind; which he proves by the fact that then contrary opinions could stand simultaneously. Such conclusion is more unacceptable in that case than the hypothesis [sc. that ‘its opposite could not come into the mind’].

256. So here. If you allow that no proposition is known per se, I refuse to dispute with you, because it is clear that you are impudent, and are not persuaded [sc. that what you allow is true], as is plain in your actions, as the Philosopher objects, Metaphysics 4.3.100535-6a18: for, when dreaming about getting something that is sort of close by and waking up afterwards, you do not pursue it as you would pursue it if, being awake, you were close to obtaining it. But if you allow that some proposition is known per se, and that about anything an indisposed power can err (as is plain in dreams), then, so that some proposition may be known to be known per se, there must be a possibility of knowing when the power is disposed and when not, and consequently it is possible for knowledge about our acts to be had that the power is thus disposed, because that is known per se which appears known per se to it.

257. I say then to the form of this caviling [n.254] that, just as it appears to a dreamer that he sees, so could the opposite appear to him of a principle of speculation that is known per se; and yet it does not follow that that principle is not per se known. And so it does not follow that it is not per se known to a hearer that he is hearing, for an indisposed power can err about anything, but not a disposed power. And when it is disposed and when it is not disposed is per se known - otherwise it could not be known that anything else was per se known, because it could not be known what will be per se known, whether what the intellect assents to when disposed in this way, or what it assents to when disposed in that way.

D. Against the Conclusion itself of the Opinion

258. About the fourth article [n.218], against the conclusion of the opinion, I argue as follows: I ask, what does he understand by certain and sincere truth [n.214]? Either infallible truth, namely truth without doubt and deception; and it was proved and made clear above, in the second and third articles [nn.229-257], that that can be had by pure natural powers. Or he understands by truth that which is a property of being, and then, since being can be naturally understood, so also can true be, as it is a property of being; and if the true then, by way of abstraction, truth too, because any form that can be understood as it is in its subject can be understood as it is in itself and in abstraction from the subject. Or he understands by truth, in another way, conformity to the exemplar; and if to the created exemplar, then the proposed conclusion is plain [sc. n.202, that truth can be known without the aid of uncreated light]. But if to the uncreated exemplar, conformity to that cannot be understood save in the exemplar as known, because a relation is not known if the extreme is not known. So what is posited, that the eternal exemplar is the reason for knowing and is not known [n.214], is false.

259. Further, second as follows: everything that simple understanding can understood confusedly it can know definitively, by inquiring into the definition of the known thing by way of division. This definitive knowledge seems to be most perfect knowledge belonging to simple understanding. Now from such most perfect knowledge of the terms can the intellect most perfectly understand a principle, and from a principle the conclusion; and in this does intellectual knowledge seem to be so completed that there does not seem to be necessary knowledge of truth beyond the aforesaid truths [above here, n.259].

260. Again, third: either the eternal light, which you say is necessary for having sincere truth [n.215], causes something naturally prior to the act or it does not. If it does, then either in the object or in the intellect. Not in the object, because the object, insofar as it has being in the intellect, does not have real being but only intentional being; therefore it is not capable of any real accident. If in the intellect, then the uncreated light does not move the intellect to knowing sincere truth save by means of its own effect; and then the common view [Alexander of Hales, Thomas Aquinas, Bonaventure] seems, as much as this position does, to posit knowledge in the uncreated light, because it posits it to be seen in the agent intellect which is an effect of the uncreated light and more perfect than that created accidental light would be. But if the uncreated light causes nothing prior to the act, then either the light alone causes the act, or the light along with the intellect and object does. If the light alone, then the agent intellect has no operation in the knowledge of sincere truth, which seems unacceptable. For this operation is the most noble in our intellect, so the agent intellect, which is the noblest intellect in the soul, should in some way come together in this action [cf. Ord. Prol. n.52].a And also is this unacceptable result, which is inferred there, proved in another way from the preceding opinion [n.260 init.], because, according to him who thinks thus [Henry, Summa a.3 q.4], an agent using an instrument cannot have an action surpassing the action of the instrument; therefore since the virtue of the agent intellect is not capable of knowledge of sincere truth, it follows that the eternal light, when using the agent intellect, will not be capable of the action of this knowledge of sincere truth, such that the agent intellect have the idea there of instrument [cf. Ord. Prol. n.51]. If you say that the uncreated light along with the intellect and the object cause this sincere truth, this is the common opinion, which posits that the eternal light causes, as remote cause, all certain truth. Either then this opinion will be unacceptable or will not disagree with the common opinion.

a.a [Interpolated text; cf. Lectura I d.3 n.188] And again, the act of understanding would not be said to belong more to one man than to another; and in this way the agent intellect would be superfluous, which is not something to say, since it belongs to the agent intellect to make all things, as it belongs to the possible intellect to become all things [On the Soul 3.5.430a14-15]. Likewise, according to the Philosopher, ibid. 430a10-14, the agent intellect corresponds [to the possible intellect] under the idea of being active, the possible intellect [corresponds to the agent intellect] under the idea of being passive; so, whatever the possible intellect receives, to that is the agent intellect in some way actively disposed.

E. Solution of the Question

261. To the question [n.218], therefore, I say that, because of the words of Augustine, one must concede that infallible truths are seen in eternal rules, where the ‘in’ is taken objectively, and this in four ways: either as in the proximate object, or as in what contains the proximate object, or as in that by virtue of which the proximate object moves [the intellect], or as in the remote object.

262. To understand the first [n.261] I say that all intelligibles have intelligible being in the act of the divine intellect, and in them do all truths about them shine forth, such that the intellect understanding them, and understanding by virtue of them the necessary truths about them, sees these necessary truths in them as in their objects. And they, insofar as they are secondary objects of the divine intellect, are truths because in conformity with their exemplar, namely the divine intellect; and they are light because manifest; and they are unchangeable there and necessary. But they are eternal in a certain respect, because eternity is a condition of what exists, and they do not have existence save in a certain respect. So we can first, then, be said to see in eternal light, that is, in a secondary object of the divine intellect, which is the truth and eternal light, in the way explained.

263. The second way [n.261] is likewise plain, because the divine intellect contains them as a book, just as the authority of Augustine says, On the Trinity 14.15, that “these rules are written in the book of eternal light” [n.205], that is, in the divine intellect insofar as it contains these truths. And though the book not be seen, yet the truths are seen that are written in that first book. And to that extent could our intellect be said to see truths in the eternal light, that is, in the book as in what contains the object.a And either of these two ways [n.262-263] seems to be of the meaning of Augustine in On the Trinity 12.14 n.23, that “the idea of a square body remains incorruptible and unchangeable etc.” But it does not remain such save as it is a secondary object of the divine intellect.

a.a [Cancelled text by Scotus] and this according to the second way [n.263], or in the truths that are the eternal light in a certain respect, just as, according to the first way, we see in their objects [n.262].

264. But against the first way [n.262] there is a doubt. For if we do not see these truths as they are in the divine intellect (because we do not see the divine intellect), how are we said to see in the uncreated light by the fact we see in a sort of eternal light in a certain respect, which light has being in the uncreated light as in the knowing intellect?

265. To this the third way [n.261] responds, which is as follows: they, as they are the secondary object of the divine intellect, only have being in a certain respect; and a true, real operation does not belong to anything that is, by virtue of itself, precisely a being in a certain respect; but if in some way it does belong to it, this has to be by virtue of something that has being simply. Therefore, it does not belong to these secondary objects precisely to move the intellect save by virtue of the being of the divine intellect, which is being simply and by which these [secondary objects] have being in a certain respect. So, therefore, we see in eternal light in a certain respect, as in a proximate object [n.262]; but in the uncreated eternal light we see in the third way, as in the proximate cause by whose virtue the proximate object moves [the intellect].

266. Following on from this, it can also be said that, as concerns the third way [n.265], we see in eternal light as in the cause of the object in itself; for the divine intellect produces them, by its own act, in intelligible being, and by its own act it gives being of this sort to this object and being of that sort to that object, and consequently it gives to them the relevant sort of idea of being an object, by which ideas they afterwards move the intellect to certain knowledge. And that it could properly be said that our intellect, because the light is the cause of the object, sees in the light, is apparent through a likeness; for we are properly said to understand in the light of the agent intellect, although however that light is only the active cause or what in its own act makes the object, or by virtue of which the object moves, or both.

267. This double causality, therefore, of the divine intellect (because it is the uncreated true light that produces secondary objects in intelligible being, and because it is that by virtue of which the secondary produced objects also actually move the intellect) can as it were make whole the third member [nn.261265], by which we are said truly to see in the eternal light.

268. And if it be objected against these two ways, which make whole the third one about the cause [n.267], that then it seems rather that we would be said to see in God as willing, or in God as he is will, than in God as he is light, because the divine will is the immediate principle of any act that is directed externally - I reply: the divine intellect, insofar as it is in some way prior to an act of the divine will, produces these objects in intelligible being and so seems, with respect to them, to be a merely natural cause; for God is a not free cause with respect to anything save that which, in some way prior to itself, presupposes the will according as it is an act of will. And just as the intellect, as prior to an act of will, produces objects in intelligible being, so it seems to cooperate with the intelligibles for their natural effect as a prior cause, so that, namely, the intelligibles may, as apprehended and combined, cause the apprehension’s conformity with them. A contradiction therefore seems to be involved in some intellect’s forming such a composition and the composition’s not being in conformity with the terms (though not composing the terms is possible); for although God voluntarily cooperates with the intellect in its composing or not composing terms, yet when the intellect has composed them, that the composition be in conformity with the terms, this seems necessarily to follow the idea of the terms that the terms have from God’s intellect, which causes the terms naturally in their intelligible being.

269. And herefrom appears how no special illumining is necessary for seeing things in eternal rules, because Augustine does not posit that truths are seen in them save those that are necessary by the force of the terms. And in such truths there is the greatest naturalness as regards the effect of both the remote and the proximate cause, namely of both the divine intellect as to the objects moving the intellect and of the objects as to the truth of the complex, the proposition, about them And also, although naturalness as regard perceiving the truth that ‘the opposite includes a contradiction’ is not as great, yet there is naturalness on the part of the proximate cause when the remote cause is assisting with it, because the terms when apprehended and composed are of a nature to cause the evidence of the conformity of the composition with the terms naturally. And if it be posited that God acts along with the terms with a general influence for this effect not, however, with natural necessity - still, whether there is a general influence or, what is more, a natural necessity influencing the terms toward this effect, it is plain that no special illumining is required.

270. The assumption about what Augustine means is plain from what he says in On the Trinity 4.35 n.20 (he is speaking about the philosophers), “Some of them were able to raise their mind’s gaze beyond all creatures and to attain, in however little a part, the light of unchangeable truth, and they mock the fact that many Christians, who live by faith alone, are not yet able to.” Therefore , he maintains that Christians do not see the things of faith in the eternal rules, while the philosophers do see many necessary things in them.

271. Also ibid. 9.6 n.9, “Not just any man’s sort of mind etc .” [cf. n.202], as if he were to say that contingent things are not seen there but necessary ones.

272. And ibid. 4.16 n.21 he argues against these philosophers: “Is it because they contend most truly that all things come to be by eternal ideas that they were able, for that reason, to espy in those very ideas how many kinds of animals, how many seeds of individuals, there are in the origin?” etc . “Surely it was not by unchangeable science that they searched all these things out, but through the history of places and times, and they believed what was experienced and written down by others?” Therefore , he means that it is not through eternal rules that they know the contingent facts that are known only through the senses or believed through histories; and yet a special illumining is more required in things believed than in necessities known; indeed in the latter most of all is a special illumining taken away, and a general illumining alone enough.

273. On the contrary: what then is Augustine saying in ibid. 12.14 n.23, that “it belongs to few to reach the intelligible ideas by the mind’s gaze” [cf. n.204], and in 83 Questions q.46 n.2, “only pure souls attain to them”?

274. I reply: this purity must not be understood as purity from vices, because in On the Trinity 14.15 n.21 he maintains that the unjust sees in eternal rules what is the just thing to be done; and in chapter 15 from ibid. 4 already cited [n.270] he maintains that philosophers see the truth in eternal rules without faith; and in the same question [83 Questions q.46 n.1] he maintains that no one can be wise without knowledge of the ideas (in the way they would perhaps concede that Plato was wise). Rather must this purity be understood to be by elevation of the intellect to a consideration of truths as they shine forth in themselves, not just as they shine forth in a phantasm.

275. One needs to consider here that the external sensible thing causes in the imaginative power a phantasm that is confused and one per accidens, namely a phantasm that represents a thing according to quantity, according to figure and color and other sensible accidents. And just as a phantasm represents only confusedly and per accidens, so do many perceive only a being per accidens. Now the first truths are precisely first by the proper idea of their terms, in that the terms are abstracted from everything conjoined to them per accidens. For this proposition, ‘the whole is greater than its part’, is not first a truth as ‘whole’ is in stone or wood, but as ‘whole’ is abstracted from everything to which it is per accidens conjoined. And an intellect, therefore, that never understands a totality save in a per accidens concept, that is, in a totality of stone or wood, never understands the genuine truth of the above principle, because it never understands the precise idea of the term by which the principle is true.

276. It therefore belongs to few to reach eternal ideas, because it belongs to few to have understandings per se, and it belongs to many to have such per accidens concepts. But these few are not said to be distinguished from the others on account of a special illumining, but either on account of better natural endowments (because they have an intellect that abstracts more and is more perceptive), or on account of a greater investigation whereby someone equally endowed reaches to a knowledge of the quiddities that another, who does not investigate, does not know. And in this way is understood Augustine’s comment, On the Trinity 9.6. n.11, about someone seeing from the top of a mountain, who sees the clouds below and the clear air above. For he who only ever understands per accidens concepts in the way a phantasm represents objects of the sort that are, as it were, per accidens beings - he is, as it were, in the valley, surrounded by clouds. But he who separates out quiddities, understanding them precisely in a per se concept, which quiddities, however, in the phantasm shine forth with many other accidents adjoined - he has the phantasm beneath him, like the clouds, and is himself on the mountain top, to the extent he knows the truth and sees the true up above, as a higher truth, in virtue of the uncreated intellect that is the eternal light.

277. In the last way [sc. the fourth, n.261] it can be conceded that pure truths are known in the eternal light as in a known remote object, because the uncreated light is the first principle of speculative things and the ultimate end of practical things; and therefore are from it the first principles taken, both the speculative and the practical. And for this reason is the knowledge of all things (both speculative and practical), taken through principles from the eternal light as known, more perfect and purer than the knowledge taken through principles in their proper genus. And in this way does knowledge of all things pertain to the theologian, as was said in the question about the subject of theology [Ord. Prol. n.206]; and it is more eminent than any other knowledge whatever. In this way is the pure truth said to be known, because through it is known what is truth only, not having anything of non-truth mixed in; for it is from the first being, from which as known the principles of knowing in this way are taken. But anything else whatever, from which the principles of knowing in general are taken, is defective truth. Only God knows in this way all things in their purity alone, because, as was said in the question about theology [Ord. Prol. nn.200-201], only he knows all things precisely through his essence; every other intellect, in virtue of him, can be moved by something else to know a truth [Ord. Prol. nn.202, 206]. For to know that a triangle has three angles [equal to two right angles] as this is a certain participation of God and possesses such sort of order in the universe, because it, as it were, expresses more perfectly the perfection of God - this is to know that a triangle has three angles etc. in a nobler way than to know it through the idea of a triangle [sc. a plane figure bound by three straight lines, Ord. I d.2 n.27]. And to know in this way that one should live temperately for attaining ultimate beatitude, which is by reaching God’s essence in itself, is to know this practical knowable more perfectly than to know it through some principle in the genus of morals, as for example through the principle that one should live honorably.

278. And in this way does Augustine speak of the uncreated light as known, On the Trinity 15.27 n.50 where, speaking to himself, he says, “Many truths have you seen, and truths that you discerned by this light which, as shining on you, you saw by. Raise up your eyes to the light itself, and fix them on it if you can; for thus will you see how distant the birth of God’s Word is from the procession of God’s Gift.” And a little later, “These and other things this light has shown to your interior eyes. What then is the cause why, with gaze fixed, you will not be able to see it, save surely your infirmity?” etc. [cf. n.187].

279. From what has been said [nn.262-278] the answer is plain to all the authorities of Augustine for the opposite side [nn.202-206]; and according to one or other of the stated ways of seeing ‘in’ [n.261] can the authorities of Augustine that occur on this matter be expounded.

F. Once More Against the Fundamental Reasons Adduced

280. About the sixth article [n.218] one must see how the three reasons given for the first opinion [nn.211-213] prove something true insofar as they are taken from Augustine, although they do not prove the false conclusion they are introduced for [nn.214-217].

Here one needs to know.. ,a, b

a.a After this Scotus stopped writing on this question.

b.b [Interpolated text] .. .that from sensibles, as from a per se cause and principle, genuine truth is not to be expected, because the knowledge of the senses is truly something per accidens, as was said [nn.234, 245] (although some acts of the senses be certain and true). But by virtue of the agent intellect, which is a participation in the uncreated light that shines on the phantasm, the quiddity of the thing is known, and from this is true genuineness obtained. And hereby is the first argument of Henry solved [n.211], and it does not, according to Augustine’s intention, prove anything further.
To Henry’s second reason [n.212] I say that the soul can be changed from one disparate act to another, according to the diversity of the objects and the soul’s lack of limitation and immateriality, because it has relation to any being at all; and finally from act to non-act, because it is not always in act. But with respect to first principles, whose truth is known from the terms, and with respect to conclusions evidently deduced from the terms, it is not changeable from contrary to contrary, from true to false. For the rules, in the light of the agent intellect, set the intellect right, and the intelligible species of the terms, though in being the species be changeable, yet by representing in the light of the agent intellect it represents unchangeably. And through these two intelligible species are the terms of the first principle known; and so the union is true and certain evidently.
To the third [n.213] one must say that its conclusion is against him [Henry], because it posits only an intelligible species or a phantasm, and it does not prove a conclusion about the intelligible species representing the quiddity. But one must say that, if the sense powers are not impeded, the species of the sensible truly represent the thing. But in sleep the powers of the exterior senses are bound; therefore, the imaginative power, in conserving the sensible species according to the diversity of the flow of humors in the head, apprehends them as the things of which they are the likenesses, because they have the force of things, according to the Philosopher Motion of Animals 7.701b18-22. The third reason does not prove more.

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